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Abstract Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist
account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model.
According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast,
belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a
working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, ac-
cording to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding
occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning
problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide
whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide
whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When
belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts
that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than
logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere
with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-
processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic
judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical
structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge
necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa
otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest rea-
soning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in
lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability
interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse.
For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and
single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in
that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree
that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most
complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion be-
lievability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice
versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion
validity on judgments of belief.
Keywords Deductive reasoning . Conflict detection . Dual
process theory . Logic . Belief
The effects of beliefs on logical reasoning are pervasive and
have been investigated for almost nine decades (Wilkins,
1929). The believability of conclusions influences how argu-
ments are evaluated across a wide range of paradigms.
Believable conclusions are deemed more acceptable than un-
believable ones regardless of logical validity (Evans, Barston,
& Pollard, 1983), regardless of the strength of the arguments
(Stanovich & West, 1997), and regardless of whether the task
involves formal or informal reasoning (Thompson & Evans,
2012). The goal of the current paper is to test predictions from
two competing theoretical accounts of belief bias in deductive
reasoning, both of which can be placed under the wider meta-
theoretical framework of dual process theories of reasoning.
According to dual process theory, two types of qualitatively
different cognitive processes can be distinguished: Type 1
processes are autonomous and Type 2 processes require work-
ing memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). According to the
default-interventionist instantiation of dual process theory,
Type 1 processes cue default responses which may then be
overridden by Type 2 processes. The default-interventionist
account further assumes that beliefs are accessible to Type 1
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processing, but that accurate logical reasoning requires Type 2
processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b). Consequently, belief
effects arise because the (generally faster) Type 1 processes
substitute an answer based on belief for one based on logical
validity (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005).
Recently, however, theorists have acknowledged that this
characterization is too simple for a number of reasons (see
e.g., Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Equating Type 1 pro-
cesses with bias and Type 2 processing with normative rea-
soning is a fallacy (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013a; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook,
2011): Type 1 processes produce errors on some occasions
and correct responses on others, as do Type 2 processes.
This is empirically supported by evidence that judgments
based on formal norms such as logic and probability (tradi-
tionally equated with Type 2 processing) may be made quick-
ly and implicitly, suggesting that these judgments may, in
some instances, arise from Type 1 processes. For example,
recent evidence suggests that some types of simple logical
arguments are processed autonomously (Bago & De Neys,
2017; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Trippas, Handley, Verde,
& Morsanyi, 2016; though see Klauer & Singmann, 2013).
Similarly, although belief judgments have been shown to be
made rapidly and accurately, it is well established that these
involve some form of inferential processing distinct from pure
fact-retrieval from memory (Reder, 1982). Furthermore, the
automaticity of belief judgments depends on various mediat-
ing factors such as mind-set and task demands (Wiswede,
Koranyi, Mueller, Langner, & Rothermund, 2013). A review
of the available evidence suggests that occasionally belief
judgments may require considerable time and effort (cf.,
Handley & Trippas, 2015), suggesting that here too a pure
classification in terms of Type 1 or Type 2 processing is overly
simplistic. Taken together, these data support models in which
logical and belief-based processing is initiated simultaneously
(De Neys, 2012, 2014; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook,
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Sloman, 2014).
Direct evidence for this position comes from a pair of stud-
ies by Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011) and
Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, and Thompson (2014).
Handley and colleagues instructed reasoners to evaluate con-
clusions to very simple logical arguments of the modus
ponens form (i.e., if p, then q; p, therefore q). The novel
element of the task was that they were asked to provide one
of two judgments: on one half of the trials, participants had to
evaluate the validity of the conclusion (as is traditionally
done), but on the other half, they had to evaluate the believ-
ability of the conclusion (as has been investigated extensively
in research on truth verification, cf. Reder, 1982). When the
two sources of information conflicted, it was found that the
validity of the syllogism interfered with the ability to make
belief judgments, as evidenced by higher error rates and lon-
ger response times for conflict than non-conflict problems.
This pattern would not be expected if judgments of validity
took longer or were more difficult than judgments of belief.
Pennycook and colleagues replicated this finding using a
completely different task, modelled on Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1973) base-rate task. Participants were provided
with the base-rate probability of category membership (e.g.,
5% of the people in this sample are engineers and 95% are
lawyers) and a personality description of an individual (e.g.,
John is a great computer programmer and loves board games).
Again, when the two sources of information conflicted, the
base-rate information interfered with making belief-based
judgments, which is inconsistent with the view that the latter
form a fast, default response (Kahneman 2011).
Collectively, these data seem to support parallel processing
(De Neys, 2012; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook et al.,
2015; Sloman, 2014) in that multiple relevant problem fea-
tures (e.g., structure and belief content) may be processed
simultaneously. In the case where both problem aspects can
be assessed in a relatively simple way, they cause mutual
interference. However, in cases where one or the other re-
sponse requires more complex processing, an asymmetry
should arise (Handley & Trippas, 2015). According to the
parallel-processing model, it is the complexity of the relevant
problem features that determines response accuracy and
speed. Logical judgments superseded belief judgments in the
cases presented by Handley et al. (2011) due to the relative
simplicity of the logical structure versus the somewhat more
moderate complexity of the belief judgments. This directly
implies that as the logical judgments become more complex,
the interference should reverse – with conflict affecting logic
judgments more than belief judgments.
In support of this hypothesis, some studies show that the
extent of belief bias observed varies as a function of the logical
complexity of the problem – typically characterized as the
number of mental-models that need to be evaluated to deter-
mine the validity of an inference (see e.g., Johnson-Laird,
2001). For example, logical problems that can be solved by
constructing only a single representation of the premises show
less belief-bias than more complex problems – that is, argu-
ments which according to mental-model theory require the
construction of up to three representations to definitively de-
termine their logical validity1 (Klauer, Musch, & Naumer,
2000; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; Oakhill,
Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989; Trippas, Handley, &
Verde, 2013). The fact that belief bias tends to be reduced
on simpler problems is consistent with the hypothesis that
1 Even though we draw on mental-model theory as a means of defining prob-
lem complexity, we do not rule out the possibility that alternative mental
representations or reasoning strategies are being used by our participants
(e.g., probability heuristics: Chater & Oaksford, 1999; mental logic: Braine
& O'Brien, 1991). Furthermore, these alternative frameworks also allow for
the characterization of inferential complexity in a way which generally maps
on to the one provided by mental-model theory.
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judgments of validity are completed more quickly and thus
that beliefs have less of an opportunity to interfere with a
rapidly generated logical response. On the other hand, the
evidence that belief bias increases with complexity is not al-
ways consistent (Evans & Pollard, 1990).
The goal of the current paper is to provide a direct test of
the complexity hypothesis by varying the difficulty of the
logical task, and asking participants to evaluate logical valid-
ity and conclusion believability. We predicted that the degree
to which logical validity and belief judgments interfere with
each other will depend on the complexity of the processes
required to render them. If the logical structures are extremely
simple, then we expected to replicate past findings and show
that validity interferes more with belief-judgments than vice
versa (Handley et al., 2011). As logical complexity increases,
this asymmetry should be reduced, and in fact, should be
reversed for the most complex logical problems, where believ-
ability should interfere more with logic judgments than vice-
versa.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, our aim was to replicate and extend the
findings by Handley et al. (2011) to a set of more difficult
conditionals (modus tollens: If p, then q; not q, therefore not
p). Participants were given a set of problems that included
both modus ponens and modus tollens inferences and asked
to judge whether the conclusion was logically valid half the
time or believable the other (see also Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
2002, for a mental-models account of how people reason
about such conditional inferences). On half of the trials, logi-
cal analysis and belief analysis produced the same response
(no-conflict trials: i.e., valid-believable and invalid-unbeliev-
able) and on the other half, they produced different responses
(conflict trials: i.e., valid-unbelievable and invalid-believ-
able). The modus ponens trials were expected to replicate
Handley et al. (2011) in that logic-belief conflicts should have
a greater impact on belief judgments than logic judgments.
Whereas performance with modus ponens is usually quite
high, accuracy is lower for modus tollens (Wason, 1968; see
Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993 for review). Thus, for
modus tollens, we predict the asymmetry in complexity to
either be reduced or to reverse direction.
Method
Participants Forty-five undergraduate psychology students
from Plymouth University (UK) or the University of
Saskatchewan (Canada) participated in exchange for course
credit. Thirty-two participants were female and 13 were male
(age range = 18–35 years, M = 19).
Design, materials and measures We used a 2 (belief-logic
conflict: conflict vs. no conflict) × 2 (instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (argument type: modus ponens vs. modus tollens)
within subjects design. We created four lists containing 64
arguments each, half of which were modus ponens and half
of which were modus tollens, based on 32 distinct item con-
tent themes (see Table 1 for examples). We crossed logical
validity and conclusion believability to create 16 conflict (val-
id-unbelievable, invalid-believable) and 16 no-conflict (valid-
believable, invalid-unbelievable) items within each argument
type. Half of the problems were presented under logic instruc-
tions and half were presented under belief instructions. Item
contents were counterbalanced by using only half of the
themes per item list, half of which were used to create modus
ponens problems, and half to create modus tollens problems.
Within each argument type each theme was presented four
times, once in each conflict by instruction cell. Problem con-
tents were taken and extended fromHandley et al. (2011, Exp.
5). We measured accuracy, response time, and confidence on
each trial. On each trial, the major (conditional) premise was
presented. Upon pressing the spacebar the major premise dis-
appeared and the minor (categorical) premise appeared, as did
the conclusion and the response options. The response options
acted as the instructional cue: under logic instructions, the
response options were Bvalid^ and Binvalid^; under belief
instructions, the response options were Bbelievable^ and
Bunbelievable.^ Responses were made by pressing the s-key
(valid/believable, depending on instructions) or the k-key (in-
valid/unbelievable). After each response, we asked the partic-
ipants to indicate how confident they were that their response
was correct on a scale from 1 (guess) to 3 (certain). We also
analyzed confidence ratings2 as they have been shown to re-
flect conflict, thus potentially providing converging evidence
for the accuracy and response time data (Johnson, Tubau, &
De Neys, 2016). There were 16 practice trials with feedback
(not analyzed), and 64 experimental trials (presented in a ran-
domized order for each participant).
Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
four problem randomizations. Before starting the experiment
they were briefed about the study, asked to sign a consent
form, and presented with the following instructions:
When instructed to answer according to beliefs you
must answer according to your knowledge of what is
true in the world, for example:
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full.
2 The confidence ratings were collected with the aim to conduct signal detec-
tion theory (SDT) analyses (cf., Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010; Trippas,
Handley, & Verde, 2014), which we did not report given that they converged
with the reported analyses. As a consequence, our confidence rating scale has a
very low resolution, potentially negatively impacting the possibility of
uncovering meaningful patterns. We report the data for completeness’ sake.
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Suppose your glass is empty.
Does it follow that your drink will be full?
The correc t answer according to bel ie fs i s
UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your knowledge
of the world you know that if a drink is finished then the
glass will be empty, hence the conclusion is unbeliev-
able. However, when instructed to answer according to
logic you must assume each statement is true (even if in
reality it is not true) and respond with the answer which
logically follows from the statements presented, e.g.:
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full.
Suppose you finish your drink.
Does it follow that your drink is empty?
The correct answer according to logic is INVALID, be-
cause the first premise states that Bif you finish a drink
then the glass will be full^ and supposing you Bfinish
your drink^ you must logically conclude that your drink
will be full. This is why the conclusion Bdoes it follow
that your drink is empty^ is logically invalid.
After completing the experiment participants were thanked
and debriefed by the experimenter.
Results
Analysis approach We analyzed the accuracy data using a
generalized linear mixed model approach with a logit link, bino-
mially distributed residuals, and a random effects structure
justified by the experimental design and the data (Barr, Levy,
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen,
submitted). Random intercepts for participants were included,
as were random slopes for the main effects of the within-
participants manipulations. Failures to converge were addressed
by either dropping the random effect which explained the least
variance, or by assuming the covariances between the random
effects were 0 (these approaches led to identical conclusions
unless otherwise noted). Odds ratios (ORs) of the fixed effects
coefficients of the full model are reported as effect sizes (Hosmer
& Lemeshow, 2004), as there is considerable debate about how
to calculate effect size within the generalized linear mixedmodel
framework with correlated random effects (Nakagawa &
Schielzeth, 2013). We used R for all our analyses (R Core
Team, 2015). The mixed function from the afex package
(Singmann, Bolker, & Westfall, 2015) was used to test for all
main effects and interactions. This function relies on the lme4
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Response
times and confidence ratings were analyzed in an analogous
fashion, with the exception that we logarithmically transformed
the response times prior to analyzing the data, and that we as-
sumed normally distributed residuals without a link function. For
these analyses we report effect size in terms of Cohen’s d calcu-
lated from the means and standard deviations of the full model.
Prior to the analyses, two participants were removed be-
cause they scored substantially below chance on the conflict
items (<40% accuracy), suggesting that they may have
misinterpreted the task (i.e., responding on the basis of logic
Table 1 Experiment 1: Examples of the problems with correct responses
CONFLICT PROBLEMS NO-CONFLICT PROBLEMS
Valid – Unbelievable Valid – Believable
MP: If a child is happy, then it cries MP: If a child is happy, then it laughs
Suppose a child is happy Suppose a child is happy
Does it follow that the child cries? Does it follow that the child laughs?
MT: If a child is happy, then it cries MT: If a child is sad, then it cries
Suppose a child laughs Suppose a child laughs
Does it follow that the child is sad? Does if follow that the child is happy?
Correct according to logic: YES Correct according to logic: YES
Correct according to beliefs: NO Correct according to beliefs: YES
Invalid – Believable Invalid – Unbelievable
MP: If a child is happy, then it cries MP: If a child is happy, then it laughs
Suppose a child is happy Suppose a child is happy
Does it follow that the child laughs? Does it follow that the child cries?
MT: If a child is happy, then it cries MT: If a child is sad, then it cries
Suppose a child laughs Suppose a child laughs
Does it follow that the child is happy? Does it follow that the child is sad?
Correct according to logic: NO Correct according to logic: NO
Correct according to beliefs: YES Correct according to beliefs: NO
Note. MP: example of modus ponens inference, MT: example of modus tollens inference
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under belief instructions and vice versa). An additional 100
observations (<3.5%) were flagged as outliers based on re-
sponse time boxplots and removed.
Accuracy The accuracy data are summarized in Table 2. A 2
(Conflict: conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (Problem Type: modus ponens vs. modus tollens)
within-participants analysis of accuracy indicated the follow
pattern of results: Accuracy was lower for conflict (M = .68)
than for no-conflict (M = .92) problems, χ2(1) = 39.7, p <
.0001, OR = 2.88. Accuracy was also lower for modus tollens
(M = .78) than for modus ponens (M = .82) problems, χ2(1) =
18.05, p < .0001, OR = 1.33. Conflict and Problem Type
interacted, χ2(1) = 15.54, p < .0001, OR = 1.31, indicating
that the conflict – no-conflict difference was larger for modus
ponens (diff = 0.27) than for modus tollens (diff = .21) prob-
lems. Instructions and Problem Type also interacted, χ2(1) =
12.79, p = .0003, OR = 1.28, indicating that for the modus
ponens problems, belief-based accuracy (M = .79) was lower
than logic-based accuracy (M = .85), whereas no such differ-
ence emerged for the modus tollens problems (M belief = .79,M
logic = .77). These effects were qualified by a marginal three-
way interaction, χ2(1) = 3.47, p = .06, OR = 1.14 We
interpreted this interaction by analyzing the data for the modus
ponens and the modus tollens problems separately.
For the modus ponens problems, there was a significant
main effect of Conflict (M conflict = .95, M no-conflict =
.68), χ2(1) = 44.11, p < .0001, OR = 5.11, as well as a main
effect of Instruction (M logic = .85, M belief = .79), χ2(1) =
7.35, p = .007, OR = 2.23. Crucially, these factors interacted,
χ2(1) = 5.34, p = .02, OR = 1.48, indicating that belief-logic
conflict interfered more with belief judgments (diff = .30) than
with logic judgments (diff = .24), with both significantly dif-
ferent from 0, all p < .001, all OR > 2.51.
For the modus tollens problems, there was only a main
effect of Conflict (M conflict = .89, M no-conflict = .68),
χ2(1) = 26.58, p < .0001, OR = 2.06. No other effects
approached significance, all ps > .30.3 Thus, for the easier
modus ponens inference, we replicated earlier findings that
logical validity interfered more with belief judgments than
vice versa (Handley et al., 2011), but this difference disap-
peared for the more difficult modus tollens inferences. For
these more complex arguments, the interference was symmet-
rical, with validity interfering with belief judgments and vice
versa to a similar degree.
Response time The data are summarized in Table 3. A 2
(Conflict: conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (Problem Type: modus ponens vs. modus tollens)
within-participants analysis of log-transformed response time
indicated the following pattern of results: Conflict significant-
ly slowed down responding (M conflict = 4786 ms, M no-conflict
4503 ms, geometric means), χ2(1) = 7.71, p = .006, d = 0.17.
Responding was also slower for modus tollens problems (M =
4853 ms) than for modus ponens problems (M = 4445 ms),
χ2(1) = 48.07, p < .0001, d = 0.27. This latter finding is
consistent with our assumption that the processes required to
generate modus tollens inferences are more complex than
those required to make modus ponens inferences. No other
effects approached significance, all ps > .18. Thus, the asym-
metry in the effect of conflict on belief and logic judgments for
modus ponens was not observed in the response time data.
Although some other studies have observed such an asymme-
try in response times, these findings are typically less consis-
tent than those from the accuracy data (Handley et al., 2011;
Pennycook et al., 2014). Nevertheless, in keeping with those
data and other published work (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic,
2008; Thompson et al., 2011), response times on the conflict
problems were longer than the non-conflict problems.
Confidence ratings The data are summarized in Table 4. A 2
(Conflict: conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (Problem Type: modus ponens vs. modus tollens)
Table 2 Experiment 1: Mean accuracy (in terms of proportion correct)
for each cell of the design
Modus Ponens Modus Tollens
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict .63 (.48) .73 (.45) .67 (.47) .69 (.46)
No Conflict .93 (.25) .97 (.17) .91 (.29) .86 (.35)
Difference .30 .24 .24 .17
Note. Standard deviations between brackets
3 A simulation of 1,000 experiments assuming 45 participants solving 64 trials
each indicated we had good power (81%) to detect small effects (d = 0.20
corresponding to a 5.6% accuracy difference), conditional on our analysis
technique.
Table 3 Experiment 1: Mean response time (in milliseconds) for each
cell of the design
Modus Ponens Modus Tollens
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict 4615 (1497) 4516 (1479) 5117 (1829) 4935 (1702)
No Conflict 4418 (1477) 4241 (1390) 4664 (1536) 4717 (1641)
Difference 197 275 453 218
Note. Standard deviations between brackets. Although we analyzed
logRTs, here we wanted to present the data in the original units. For this
purpose, we report geometric means (i.e., exp(mean(log(RT)))).
Corresponding geometric standard deviations are reported. These were
calculated by subtracting one standard deviation of log(RT) from the
mean log(RT), and taking exp(.) of the result. The resulting value was
then subtracted from the geometric mean to get an equivalent geometric
standard deviation in units of ms
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within-participants analysis of the confidence ratings (on a
scale from 1 = least confident, to 3 = most confident) demon-
strated that people were less confident when logic and belief
were in conflict compared to when this was not the case (M
conflict = 2.35,M no conflict = 2.50), χ
2 = 13.38, df = 1, p = .0003,
d = 0.23. People were significantly more confident making
belief-based than logic-based judgments (M belief = 2.47, M
logic = 2.37), χ
2 = 7.01, df = 1, p = .008, d = 0.17, which may
be surprising given that, if anything, accuracy was higher
under logic instructions. Confidence was also lower for the
modus tollens than the modus ponens problems (M MP = 2.48,
M MT = 2.36), χ
2 = 27.51, df = 1, p < .0001, d = 0.21. Finally,
Instructions and Problem type also interacted, χ2 = 7.15, df =
1, p = .008, d = 0.21, suggesting that people were equally
confident making belief and logic judgments for modus
ponens problems (M belief = 2.50, M logic = 2.47, p = .39, d =
0.06), but significantly less confident making logic than belief
judgments for modus tollens problems (M belief = 2.44,M logic
= 2.27, p = .0005, d = 0.26).This suggests that belief-based
judgments were comparable for modus ponens and modus
tollens, but that logic judgments weremore affected for modus
tollens, supporting the accuracy and response time results
showing that making a logic-based judgment is more difficult
for modus tollens than modus ponens. No other effects
approached significance, all ps > .16.
Discussion
As predicted, we found that belief-logic conflict interferes
more with belief judgments than with logic judgments for
modus ponens, but not when reasoning about the more com-
plex modus tollens. In contrast, for the modus tollens infer-
ence, the interference was bidirectional: logical validity inter-
fered with belief-judgments to the same extent that argument
believability interfered with logic judgments. Taken together,
the findings are consistent with the prediction of the parallel-
processing model that complexity of the relevant problem
features determines the nature and degree of interference
(Handley & Trippas, 2015).
The response time and confidence findings provided con-
verging evidence for this interpretation: the slower responding
and decreased confidence for modus tollens compared to
modus ponens verifies that the former arguments are more
complex. The apparent disconnect between the accuracy and
confidence findings as a function of problem type is consistent
with previous findings in the metacognitive literature suggest-
ing that the correlation between confidence and accuracy is
very moderate and affected by several alternative variables,
such as a feeling of rightness and processing fluency (Prowse
Turner & Thompson, 2009; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006).
Though not impossible, it seems challenging to reconcile
these findings within the default-interventionist framework,
which is built upon the assumption that in the deductive rea-
soning paradigm, beliefs are retrieved in an autonomous fash-
ion – in contrast to logic, the computation of which requires
working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b). On this view,
beliefs form a fast, default response that may not be overrid-
den by an attempt to reason logically. As a consequence, one
would expect the autonomous, belief-based processing to in-
terfere with the slower, logic-based processing, but not vice-
versa; this should be particularly true of the modus tollens
inference, which is believed to require more complex compu-
tations to derive than the modus ponens inference. However,
one might argue that the modus tollens inferences, while re-
quiring somewhat longer to process than the modus ponens
inference, were still computed quickly enough so that they
interfered with belief judgments. Indeed, as the data in
Table 3 indicate, latencies for the belief and logic judgments
were very similar in the case of the modus tollens inference,
suggesting that they required similar levels of processing ef-
fort. In the next study we increased the complexity of the
logical arguments. According to the parallel-processing mod-
el, doing so should reverse the pattern of results reported here.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that belief-logic conflict
interferes more with belief than with logic judgments, but that
this effect is eliminated when the complexity of the logical
argument is increased – presumably equating it to the com-
plexity of the belief judgment. In the current study, we took
the next logical step by further increasing the complexity of
the logical structure. The parallel-processing model predicts
that increased logical complexity should lead to a reversal of
the effect. In other words, belief-logic conflict should interfere
more with logic judgments than with belief judgments
(Handley & Trippas, 2015).
We tested our prediction in a syllogistic reasoning task.
Participants were presented with simple and complex syllo-
gisms. The complexity of the syllogisms was determined on a
theoretical basis as well as on an empirical one. Theoretically,
the two leading models of syllogistic reasoning suggest that
our simple syllogisms should be easier than the difficult ones,
Table 4 Experiment 1: Mean confidence rating for each cell of the
design
Modus Ponens Modus Tollens
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict 2.45 (0.70) 2.35 (0.70) 2.38 (0.74) 2.21 (0.74)
No Conflict 2.55 (0.65) 2.59 (0.59) 2.50 (0.65) 2.34 (0.74)
Difference 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.13
Note. Standard deviations between brackets. The scale ranged from 1
(least confident) to 3 (most confident)
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either because the simple syllogisms were all one-model syl-
logisms, whereas the complex syllogisms were multiple-
model ones (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), or because the
simple syllogisms require fewer and simpler heuristics to
solve (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). This theoretical analysis is
backed up by empirical findings that the simpler syllogisms
are solved more accurately than the complex ones (Klauer
et al., 2000; Trippas et al., 2013).
The simple syllogisms were hypothesized to serve a similar
role to the modus tollens conditionals in Experiment 1, sug-
gesting we can expect roughly equal interference for belief
and logic judgments. For the complex syllogisms, making
correct logical judgments will become more difficult. Thus,
we predict the opposite pattern of results observed in
Experiment 1: for simple syllogisms, we expected similar
levels of belief-logic conflict interference for belief and logic
judgments. For complex syllogisms, conflict should interfere
more for logic than for belief judgments.
Method
Participants Eighty-four undergraduate psychology students
from the University of Saskatchewan (Canada) participated in
exchange for course credit. Fifty-three participants were fe-
male and 31 were male (age range = 18–60 years, M = 22).
Design, materials and measures We used a 2 (Belief-logic
Conflict: conflict vs. no conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs. be-
lief) × 2 (Problem Type: simple syllogisms vs. complex syllo-
gisms) within-participants design. Problem contents were ran-
domly paired with logical structures as in Trippas et al. (2013).
Examples in each cell of the design can be found in Table 5. We
crossed logical validity and conclusion believability to create 16
conflict (valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable) and 16 no-
conflict (valid-believable, invalid-unbelievable) items within
each level of syllogism complexity. Half of the problems were
presented under logic instructions and half were presented under
belief instructions. Problem contents were taken and developed
from Trippas et al. (2013, Exp. 1) (see Table 5 for examples).We
measured choice, response time, and confidence. On each trial,
the premises were initially presented for a fixed period. After 3 s
the conclusion was also presented, together with the response
options, and an instructional cue at the top of the screen stating
either BELIEF or LOGIC in red. This approach was taken to
ensure that the design did not unfairly favor beliefs by permitting
a shortcut strategy where participants could simply evaluate the
conclusion believability without considering the premises. The
response options acted as an additional instructional cue: under
logic instructions, the response options were Bvalid^ and
Binvalid^; under belief instructions, the response options were
Bbelievable^ and Bunbelievable.^ Responses were made by
pressing the s-key (valid/believable, depending on the instruc-
tional set on the current trial) or the k-key (invalid/unbelievable).
After each response, we asked the participants to indicate how
confident they were that their response was correct on a scale
from 1 (guess) to 3 (certain). There were 16 practice trials with
feedback (not analyzed), and 64 experimental trials (presented in
a randomized order for each participant).
Procedure The procedure was identical to the one in
Experiment 1, with the exception of the instructions, which
now read:
In this experiment, we are interested in your ability to
make two types of judgments: judgments on the basis of
LOGIC, and judgments on the basis of BELIEFS.When
the word "LOGIC" appears in red at the top of the
screen, you should assume all the information
ABOVE the line is true (even if it's not, or if it doesn't
appear to make much sense). After a short amount of
time, a conclusion sentence BELOW the line will ap-
pear, which you will be asked about. If you judge that
the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises,
you should answer "Valid" by pressing the "s"-key, oth-
erwise you should answer "Invalid" by pressing the "k"-
key. For example:
All cars are blurbs
All blurbs are cheap
All cars are cheap
Given the instruction to respond on the basis of LOGIC,
you should respond "Valid," because the sentence "All cars
are cheap" necessarily follows from the premises above
the line (if you assume they are true).When the word
"BELIEF" appears in red at the top of the screen, you
should focus on whether the information is in line with
your beliefs about what is true in the world. If you think
the information BELOW the line is consistent with your
knowledge of the world, you should respond "Believable"
by pressing the "s"-key. Otherwise, please respond
"Unbelievable" by pressing the "k"-key. For example:
All cars are blurbs
All blurbs are cheap
All cars are cheap
Given the instruction to respond on the basis of BELIEF,
you should respond "Unbelievable" because you pre-
sumably know from your experience of the world that
the sentence "All cars are cheap" is false (consider, for
instance, the cost of a Ferrari or a Porsche).
Results
Analysis approach The analyses were performed in the same
manner as in Experiment 1. Two participants were excluded
based on their substantial (<40%) below-chance accuracy per-
formance on the conflict items, indicating that they were not
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engaging with the task. An additional 15 responses (<.01%)
were classified as outliers based on a boxplot of log-
transformed response time and excluded.
Accuracy The data are summarized in Table 6. A 2 (Conflict:
conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs. belief) × 2
(Problem Type: Simple vs. Complex) within-participants analy-
sis of accuracy indicated the follow pattern of results: as expect-
ed, accuracy was lower for conflict (M = .68) than for no-conflict
(M = .83) problems, χ2(1) = 60.45, p < .0001, OR = 1.58, and
lower for complex syllogisms (M = .71) than for simple ones (M
= .80),χ2(1) = 66.93, p< .0001,OR= 1.35. Aswe predicted, and
in contrast to Experiment 1, accuracy was lower under logic
instructions (M = .71) than under belief instructions (M = .80),
χ2(1) = 21.23, p < .0001, OR = 1.32. The predicted interaction
between Conflict and Instruction was significant, χ2(1) = 4.34, p
= .04,OR = 1.08, indicating that belief-logic conflict had a larger
effect under logic instructions (diff = .20) than under belief
instructions (diff = .12): the reverse of the pattern observed in
Experiment 1. There was an interaction between Conflict and
Problem Type, χ2(1) = 4.54, p = .03, OR = 1.08, indicating that
the effect of conflict was larger for simple problems (diff = .17)
than for complex problems (diff = .15), though the differencewas
numerically small. Finally, Instruction and Problem Type
interacted, χ2(1) = 68.57, p < .0001, OR = 1.36, suggesting that
for the simple problems, accuracy under belief and logic instruc-
tions was similar (M belief = .80, M logic = .81), whereas for the
complex problems, accuracy under belief instructions was much
higher (M = .81) than under logic instructions (M = .61).
Although the three-way interaction was not significant (p = .42,
OR = 1.03), we decided to analyze the simple and the complex
problems separately for three reasons: (1) to aid interpretation of
the complex interactive pattern described above, (2) for reasons
of a priori theoretical interest, and (3) for congruency with the
findings reported in Experiment 1.
For the simple arguments, there was a significant main
effect of Conflict (M conflict = .72, M no-conflict = .89), χ
2(1) =
69.90, p < .0001, OR = 1.91. No other effects approached
significance, ps > .15.4 Thus, like the MT problems in
Experiment 1, there was a symmetric effect of conflict for
these problems, with validity interfering with beliefs to about
the same extent as the reverse.
Table 6 Experiment 2: Mean accuracy (in terms of proportion correct)
for each cell of the design
Simple Complex
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict .73 (.45) .72 (.45) .76 (.43) .50 (.50)
No Conflict .87 (.33) .90 (.30) .85 (.36) .71 (.45)
Difference 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.21
Note. Standard deviations between brackets
4 A simulation of 1,000 experiments assuming 85 participants solving 64 trials
each indicated we had excellent power (>98%) to detect small effect (d = 0.20
corresponding to a 5.6% accuracy difference), conditional on our analysis
technique.
Table 5 Experiment 2: Examples of the problems with correct responses
CONFLICT PROBLEMS NO CONFLICT PROBLEMS
Valid – Unbelievable Valid – Believable
Simple: All drinks are dralys Simple: All salmons are vennars
No dralys are beers No venners are fruits
No beers are drinks No salmons are fruits
Complex: No boats are stamuses Complex: No murderers are catepies
Some yachts are stamuses Some criminals are categpies
Some yachts are not boats Some criminals are not murderers
Correct according to logic: YES Correct according to logic: YES
Correct according to beliefs: NO Correct according to beliefs: YES
Invalid – Believable Invalid – Unbelievable
Simple: All willows are glukers Simple: All dalmatians are curges
No glukers are trees No vegetables are curges
Some willows are trees Some vegetables are Dalmatians
Complex: No amphibians are vindeces Complex: No spears are cortemns
Some frogs are vindeces Some weapons are cortemns
Some amphibians are not frogs Some spears are not weapons
Correct according to logic: NO Correct according to logic: NO
Correct according to beliefs: YES Correct according to beliefs: NO
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For the complex arguments, there was a significant main
effect of Conflict (M conflict = .78,M no-conflict = .63), χ2(1)
= 25.72, p < .0001, OR = 1.40. There was also a significant
main effect of Instruction (M logic = .61,M belief = .81), χ2(1)
= 69, p < .0001,OR = 1.81. Crucially, Conflict and Instruction
interacted, χ2(1) = 4.86, p = .03, OR = 1.14, indicating that
belief-logic conflict interfered more with logic judgments (diff
= .21) than with belief judgments (diff = .09), with both dif-
ferent from 0, all p ≤ .03, all OR > 1.23.
This pattern mirrored the one observed in Experiment 1. In
that experiment, belief-logic conflict interfered more with be-
lief judgments than logic judgments, but only on the simplest
arguments. Here, conflict interfered with logic judgments
more than belief judgments, but only on the most complex
arguments. Thus, when the logical structures are very simple
(modus ponens), conflict interferes with judgments based on
belief.When the logical structures are of moderate complexity
(modus tollens and simple syllogisms), the interference is bi-
directional. When the logical structures are complex, conflict
interferes more with logic judgments than belief judgments.
To verify this interpretation we analyzed accuracy using a 2
(Instructions: logic vs. belief) × 2 (Complexity: modus ponens/
simple vs. modus tollens/complex) × 2 (Experiment: one [con-
ditionals] vs. two [syllogisms]) analysis of accuracy for the con-
flict items only. Consistent with the key prediction of the model,
a significant three-way interaction between Instructions,
Complexity, and Experiment emerged, χ2 = 6.92, df = 1, p =
.009, OR = 1.14. Follow-up tests comparing the effect of
Instructions for each Experiment by Complexity cell confirms
the specific direction of the interaction: For the simple condi-
tionals, accuracy was higher under logic than under belief in-
structions, χ2 = 7.44, df = 1, p = .006, OR = 1.28. For the
complex conditionals and the simple syllogisms, there were no
statistically significant differences, all χ2 < 0.30, df = 1, all p >
.58, allOR < 1.06. Finally, for the complex syllogisms, accuracy
under belief instructions is significantly higher than accuracy
under logic instructions,χ2 = 107.8, df = 1, p< .0001,OR= 1.90.
Response time The data are summarized in Table 7. A 2
(Conflict: conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (Problem Type: Simple vs. Complex) within-
participants analysis of response time indicated the following
pattern of results: conflict slowed down responding (M conflict =
9584 ms,M no-conflict = 9188 ms), χ
2(1) = 5.26, p = .02, d = .06.
People responded more slowly under logic instructions (M =
10718 ms) than under belief instructions (M = 8217 ms), χ2(1)
= 35.79, p < .0001, d = 0.42. People also responded more
slowly to complex syllogisms (M = 9902 ms) than to simple
syllogisms (M = 8894 ms), χ2(1) = 28.59, p < .0001, d = 0.17.
Conflict and Problem Type interacted, χ2(1) = 3.93, p = .05, d =
0.11, suggesting that conflict had a larger impact for the simple
problems (diff = 683 ms) than for the complex problems in-
structions (diff = 72 ms). Instruction and Problem Type also
interacted, χ2(1) = 28.29, p < .0001, d = 0.30, indicating that
for complex problems, logic-based responding (M = 11842 ms)
was a lot slower then belief-based responding (M = 8281 ms).
For the simple problems this difference was much less pro-
nounced (M logic = 9702 ms, M belief = 8154). This analysis
partly reinforces the accuracy analyses: for the complex syllo-
gisms, logical judgments were slowed relative to the belief-
based judgments, whereas for the simple problems, logic-
based responding did not suffer to the same degree.
Confidence ratings The data are summarized in Table 8. A 2
(Conflict: conflict vs. no-conflict) × 2 (Instructions: logic vs.
belief) × 2 (Problem Type: simple vs. complex) within-
participants analysis of the confidence ratings (on a scale from
1 = least confidence, to 3 = most confident) demonstrated that
people were significantly less confident for conflict (M = 2.48)
than for no-conflict trials (M = 2.54), χ2 = 10.65, df = 1, p =
.001, d = 0.10. Participants were more confident responding
under believability (M = 2.56) than logic instructions (M =
2.46), χ2 = 10.21, df = 1, p = .001, d = 0.16. Participants were
also more confident responding to the simple (M = 2.56) than
to the complex arguments (M = 2.46), χ2 = 34.87, df = 1, p <
.0001, d = 0.17. Finally, there was also a significant interaction
between Instructions and Problem Type, χ2 = 50.58, df = 1, p
< .0001, d = 0.32, suggesting that for the simple problems
there was no difference in confidence between logic and belief
judgments (M logic = 2.57,M belief = 2.55, p = .47, d = 0.04).
Table 7 Experiment 2: Mean response time (in milliseconds) for each cell of the design
Simple Complex
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict 8291 (4,437) 10305 (4,437) 8254 (4,532) 11966 (6,979)
No Conflict 8019 (4,275) 9134 (4,275) 8309 (4,456) 11718 (6,788)
Difference 272 1171 -55 248
Note. Standard deviations between brackets. Although the analysis was based on logRTs, here we wanted to present the data in the original units. For this
purpose, we report geometric means (i.e., exp(mean(log(RT)))). Corresponding geometric standard deviations are reported. These were calculated by
subtracting one standard deviation of log(RT) from the mean log(RT), and taking exp(.) of the result. The resulting value was then subtracted from the
geometric mean to get an equivalent geometric standard deviation in units of ms
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By contrast, for the complex syllogisms, people were signifi-
cantly less confident responding on the basis of logic than on
the basis of beliefs (M logic = 2.36,M belief = 2.56, p < .0001,
d = 0.36). No other effects approached significance, all ps >
.24.
Discussion
We increased the complexity of the logical judgments and
reversed the qualitative pattern of results obtained in
Experiment 1. For the simple syllogisms, the effect of conflict
was roughly comparable for belief and logic instructions. In
contrast, for the complex problems, beliefs interfered with
logic judgments more than the reverse. The confidence and
response time analyses confirmed that the complex arguments
were more difficult and complex to process than the simple
ones. We now turn to the general discussion for a more thor-
ough evaluation of the theoretical implications of these
findings.
General discussion
The traditional explanation for many so-called reasoning
biases is an assumed asymmetry in the speed and effort with
which Type 1 and Type 2 processes are executed. Although
processing speed is not considered a defining feature of dual
process theories (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013a), it is typi-
cally assumed that belief bias occurs because a quick belief-
based response beats a slower logical analysis (Evans &
Curtis-Holmes, 2005). In contrast to this default-
interventionist account, the data from the current experiments
support the parallel-processing model (Handley & Trippas,
2015) and other models (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et al.,
2015; Sloman, 2014). These models assume that logic- and
belief-based responding is initiated in parallel, rather than in
sequence. We also found support for the parallel-processing
model’s assumption that logical responses can be completed
relatively quickly or more slowly depending on their relative
complexity. Importantly, this relative complexity was shown
to produce predictable patterns of interference.
Specifically, when the logical inference is extremely sim-
ple, such as our modus ponens inference in Experiment 1,
logical validity interfered with belief-judgments more than
believability interfered with logic-judgments (as per Handley
et al., 2011). This pattern would not be possible under the
assumption that making any type of logical inference takes
longer than making belief-based judgments; instead, we inter-
pret this tomean that the processes responsible for drawing the
modus ponens inferences finished before those computing the
belief judgments, thus interfering with them. Indeed, the data
confirmed that logic judgments were made more quickly than
belief judgments in that study.
In contrast, for inferences of moderate complexity, such as
the modus tollens inferences in Experiment 1 and the simple
syllogisms in Experiment 2, the interference was symmetrical.
That is, instructions to judge validity interfered with the ability
to make judgments based on belief to the same extent that
belief instructions interfered with judging validity. Finally,
for the most difficult syllogisms in Experiment 2, the interfer-
ence was once again asymmetrical, but this time, conclusion
believability interfered more with validity judgments than
vice-versa; indeed, performance for conflict items under logic
instructions was at chance levels.
These data support a parallel-processing model, whereby
multiple sets of processes are initiated in tandem (Handley &
Trippas, 2015; Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017;
Pennycook et al., 2015; Sloman, 2014). In cases where the
processes converge on the same response (i.e., the no-conflict
trials), accuracy is high and response times are low. In cases
where the processes diverge (i.e., the conflict trials), there is
the potential for the processes to interfere with each other:
response times are higher and accuracy is lower.
Interestingly, even for the most difficult syllogisms, we ob-
served that conclusion validity interfered with the ability to
make belief judgments. This suggests that enough information
about the logical structure of the problem was extracted in
time to interfere with the believability judgment of the state-
ment when logic and belief conflicted. The difference was
relatively small, however, leaving open the possibility that this
might be an effect produced by a relatively small group of
very able reasoners. Alternatively, it is possible that there is
some other, structural information that is correlated with va-
lidity (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Klauer and Singmann, 2013)
that is interfering with belief-based processing.
Could the current findings be explained by the fact that we
relied exclusively on within-participants manipulations? In
both experiments participants could not predict whether they
would be asked to respond on the basis of logic or beliefs
before the response options appeared. It is possible that they
dealt with this by computing both the believability and logical
status of the argument during stimulus presentation, reporting
only the required judgment when the response options ap-
peared. If this is the case, then an alternative explanation for
Table 8 Experiment 2: Mean confidence rating for each cell of the
design
Simple Complex
Belief Logic Belief Logic
Conflict 2.52 (0.67) 2.54 (0.63) 2.55 (0.64) 2.32 (0.70)
No Conflict 2.57 (0.61) 2.60 (0.59) 2.58 (0.62) 2.40 (0.69)
Difference 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08
Note. Standard deviations between brackets. The scale ranged from 1
(guess) to 3 (very confident)
548 Mem Cogn (2017) 45:539–552
our findings is response competition.5 Similarly, it may be that
the task switching necessitated by our within-subjects manip-
ulation caused the interference.6 Although these effects might
be present and could explain the conflict effects that we
observed, the question remains why asymmetrical
interference occurs as a function of problem complexity. If
response competition or task switching were the sole drivers
of interference in our paradigm, we should find identical
effects of conflict regardless of problem complexity and
instruction.
Moreover, we have empirical and theoretical reasons to
believe they are not the sole explanation for our findings.
Handley et al. (2011) and Howarth, Handley, and Walsh
(2016) demonstrated that the same interference occurred in a
full between-participants comparison. Participants solved the
task in a counterbalanced blocked manner, such that in one
block only belief-based responses were required, and in the
next block only logic-based responses – and vice versa.
Comparisons of the first block between participants who
judged logic first or belief first showed that the critical inter-
action was still present. Thus, the fact that the asymmetrical
conflict effects are observed in between-participants designs
strongly suggests that our findings are not an artefact of our
within-participants manipulation.
The persistence-of-belief bias
If information about logical validity is available from an early
stage, how then do we explain belief bias? That is, why do
some reasoners apparently ignore readily available logical in-
formation in favor of a belief-based response in the face of
explicit instructions to reason logically? At this point, we do
not have a simple answer to this question, but offer the fol-
lowing alternatives:
1. Belief bias, as a phenomenon, may be the result of av-
eraging over different strategies. For example, Pennycook and
Thompson (2012) noted that base-rate neglect (i.e., the ten-
dency to base judgments on descriptive, situation-specific in-
formation rather than the base-rate probability of an event)
reflects a mixture of two different strategies, which consist
of relying on either the base rate or the stereotype. Because
the situation-specific strategy is the more common, the mean
result is base-rate neglect. Similarly, in the case of logical
reasoning, the phenomenon known as belief bias may reflect
a mixture of strategies, one that generates answers based on
validity and the other which generates answers based on be-
lief; if the latter is more common, then the average result looks
like belief bias (see Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith,
2011, for a related suggestion based on a response time anal-
ysis). The tendency to use one or the other strategy may
depend, amongst other things, on cognitive capacity (Evans,
Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010; Trippas et al., 2013) or an-
alytic thinking dispositions (Stanovich&West, 1997; Trippas,
Pennycook, Verde, & Handley, 2015).
2. Answers based on beliefs and logic may differ in their
potency or salience. De Neys and colleagues have demonstrat-
ed that, in a variety of tasks, there is evidence that reasoners
intuitively detect the conflict between formal norms such as
logic and probability and beliefs, but often fail to resolve that
conflict in favor of the formal norm (see De Neys, 2014 for a
summary). His explanation is that beliefs are difficult to inhib-
it, meaning that belief bias and other phenomena reflect a
failure to inhibit a potent, belief-based response in favor of a
normative one. A related explanation is essentially Bayesian,
namely that reasoners are (rightly) reluctant to set aside beliefs
that are based on years of learning in favor of an experi-
menter’s artificial arguments (Evans & Over, 1996). Indeed,
some people would argue that there is no point in striving to
attain logical coherence at all costs, but that correspondence
(i.e., accuracy in terms of what is true in the world) ought to be
the only relevant evaluation metric of inferential performance
(see e.g., Hammond, 1996, for an overview of the debate).
One potential reason for this is that there is apparently little
evidence that giving preference to correspondence (e.g.,
knowledge of what is true in the real world) over coherence
(e.g., adherence to the formal laws of logic) results in substan-
tial costs in the real world (Arkes, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig,
2015). Regardless of one’s perspective on such philosophical
matters, the fact remains that apparently people are influenced
by both logic and beliefs, and that the latter seems to trump the
former more often than not.
3. Answers based on logic may be held with degrees of
confidence that may vary both from individual to individual
and from inference to inference. That is, some reasoners are
more confident overall in their ability to reason, and this pre-
dicts the probability that they will provide answers based on
logical validity (Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015).
Confidence in an inference may also vary as a function of
the complexity of the calculations required to produce an in-
ference, with more complex calculations engendering a lower
degree of confidence. Thus, even though inferences based on
validity may be produced, they may be held with low confi-
dence and thus subject to re-evaluation (Thompson, Prowse
Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).
4. Much like false memories in recognition memory (Verde
& Rotello, 2003), belief bias may just be a criterion-shift-
driven response bias as interpreted within the framework of
signal detection theory (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010, 2011;
Green & Swets, 1966; Heit & Rotello, 2014; though see also
Klauer & Kellen, 2011; Trippas, Verde, Handley, Roser,
McNair, & Evans 2014; Singmann & Kellen, 2014; Trippas,
Verde, & Handley, 2015, for an extensive debate on the inter-
pretation of belief-driven criterion shifts). According to this
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
6 We would like to thank Wim De Neys for this suggestion.
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perspective, participants do not ignore argument strength, but
they are simply more likely to accept believable conclusions
than unbelievable conclusions – all else being equal. This
interpretation is not in conflict with our results given that the
signal detection theory model of belief bias is not specified at
the processing level. For instance, the model is agnostic as to
whether the response criterion is set before or after argument
strength is calculated. Furthermore, a question arises with re-
gard to how the model would capture responses under belief
instructions. Do we assume that these decisions are based on
two distributions of belief-strength, with a logic-based re-
sponse criterion which shifts according to validity (i.e., a so-
called logic-bias, Howarth et al., 2016)? For now, we argue it
is safest to rely on the signal detection theory as an excellent
measurement model until it is specified in a more dynamic
way such that it can also make predictions about the time-
course of processing (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010).
5. Finally, although our data are challenging to cap-
ture within a traditional, default interventionist explana-
tion for belief-bias, they do not rule out this framework
definitively (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a, 2013b), espe-
cially when considering the more complex forms of ar-
guments. In Experiment 2, responses based on belief
were made substantially faster than responses based on
logic, which is consistent with the hypothesis that be-
liefs form a relatively fast, default response that may
not be overturned by a slower, logical analysis (Evans
& Curtis-Holmes, 2005). We also found that belief-logic
conflict interfered more with judgments of validity than
of belief, which is also consistent with the default-
interventionist view. Indeed, one explanation that fits
the data is that some logical arguments might rely sole-
ly on Type 1 processing, whereas others require Type 2
processes; conversely, some types of belief judgments
may require Type 2 processing. According to this inter-
pretation, our experiments differed with respect to the
degree to which Type 1 and Type 2 processes were
necessary to judge logical validity.
We also note that our interpretation rests heavily on the
relative speed of belief-based and logic-based processes,
which is not the defining feature of Type 1 and Type 2 pro-
cesses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). However, our data do
suggest that some logical processes are autonomous, given
that they are initiated even when they contradict the current
goal state (i.e., to judge believability), which adds complexity
to the classification of Type 1 and Type 2 processes and chal-
lenges extant explanations of belief-bias. Moreover, the data
are challenging to the default-interventionist account of many
reasoning phenomena, which rely on relative speed as the
basis of the explanation: faster, Type 1 processes produce a
default that is not overturned by slower, Type 2 processes
(e.g., Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Toplak, West, &
Stanovich, 2011).
One argument that has been made against the parallel-
processing structure is that it is wasteful of resources (e.g.,
Evans, 2007). Why initiate costly Type 2 processes if they
are routinely terminated because the faster, Type 1 processes
have produced a response? In reply, we need to point out that
we are not arguing that the types of conflict that we are ob-
serving here necessarily arise from a conflict between Type 1
and Type 2 processes. Instead, we argue that people begin to
process both the structural features of the problem and to
evaluate the believability of the problem at the same time,
drawing simultaneously on Type 1 and 2 processing. In some
cases, where the structure is simple, a response based on logic
or probability may be generated quickly, by Type 1 processes
with onlyminimal Type 2 involvement. In other cases, such as
with our complex syllogisms, it may, indeed, require substan-
tial working memory resources to generate and evaluate a
conclusion.
Moreover, whereas there might be a cost associated with
the needless engagement of Type 2 processes, there are clear
benefits to the simultaneous engagement of multiple Type 1
processes. Redundancy gain refers to the enhanced perfor-
mance that arises when responses are based on multiple stim-
uli that converge on a single response, as opposed to a re-
sponse based on a single stimulus. Although most of the ev-
idence for this phenomenon is derived from relatively simple
tasks, there is recent evidence that this phenomenon also ap-
plies to complex tasks, such as semantic categorization
(Shepherdson &Miller, 2014). Redundancy gain would allow
more efficient processing of the non-conflict trials, wherein
responses based on multiple stimuli (beliefs and logic) con-
verged on a single response.
Conclusion
We observed that the logical validity of a conclusion interfered
with reasoners’ ability to judge the conclusion’s believability,
even on complex syllogistic problems. Less surprisingly, we
also observed that the believability of a conclusion interfered
with judgments of validity. In both cases, the degree of inter-
ference varied with the complexity of the logical argument.
For simple arguments, logic produced more interference than
beliefs. For complex arguments, the reverse was true, and for
arguments of moderate complexity, the interference was ap-
proximately symmetrical. These data are incompatible with
explanations of belief-bias that originate with the assumptions
that beliefs form a fast, default response that may not be
overturned by logical processing. Instead, they support
models in which the processing of validity and believability
begins in parallel, and the degree of interference that is ob-
served depends on the relative complexity of the processes
needed to deliver answers based on beliefs or logic.
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